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Abstract
This article poses an unsettling question. Was Hitler’s regime not so much a 
historical accident as a prototype—a creation of  modernity and a response to the 
conditions precipitated by modernity? It constructs an answer via the exploration 
of  the interdependency of  a number of  constructs. Through the building blocks 
of  symbolism the propagandist constructs an imaginary world that is neither true 
nor false, but a pseudo-reality energised by the emotion of  fear and both defined 
and constricted by ideology and beliefs. The article highlights significant differences 
between this Nazi prototype and modern practice to be taken into account. For 
example the Nazis had no theory of  soft power; however, they were much more 
aware of  the value of  entertainment as propaganda than contemporary populist 
autocracies. The article promotes a rigorous examination of  the evidence for the 
‘impact’ of  propaganda—How effective is it really?—and the need for a more 
sophisticated understanding of  its effects and purpose.
Keywords: propaganda, coercion, soft power, Hitler, China, Putin, pseudo-
democracy, pseudo-reality
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Introduction: A Nazi Prototype?
Pseudo-democracy: The world seems to be embracing not democracy but a kind 
of  propaganda-augmented neo-democracy, as China will surely become and Russia is 
now. This was not of  course supposed to be the script outlined in The End of  History.1 
One comparator is Mussolini’s Italy, i.e. a facsimile of  democracy surrounded by a 
nimbus of  nationalistic propaganda. But another is Nazi Germany. 
Was Hitler’s regime not so much a historical accident as a prototype: a creation of  
modernity and a response to the conditions precipitated by modernity? A society 
of  rootless, atomised individuals, produced by the modern workplace’s need for 
mobility of  labour and micro-specification of  task, is a fearful society, and out 
of  that fear emerges the need for solidarity. The ‘modern’ era of  mass electorates 
was vulnerable to vividly dramatized messages that evoke a binary world good and 
evil, and the corruption of  political discourse by ‘terrible simplifiers’. One might 
term such appeals regressive, yet they were sold with the latest techniques and both 
embrace and excoriate modernity, as Paxton describes in The Anatomy of  Fascism.2 
I have elsewhere argued: There was the influence of  Americanisation, for the Reich played 
with and structurally incorporated its antithesis. It was a series of  contradictions—progressive and 
reactionary, modern and anti-modern, American and anti-American.3 
But an apparatus of  authoritarian control legitimated by a massive propaganda 
apparatus is ostensibly the direction some countries have gone and some are trending. 
Mussolini observed ‘the fascist state organises the nation, but leaves a sufficient 
margin of  liberty to the individual’; ‘sovereign democracy’ was the exquisite phrase 
chosen to evoke the Putin Raj: ‘They are taking Russia to task for failing to implement 
the Western model of  democracy: but the point of  sovereign democracy is to deny 
the relevance of  that model’.4 So our assumptions about Russia were wrong; it was 
not going to be a democracy but rather a plebiscitary autocracy based on opinion 
management. All of  these regimes seek to manipulate; they offer no unvarnished 
truth, and any notion of  objectivity is missing. The purpose of  government is to 
tell people that they live in a Panglossian best in the best of  all possible worlds. So, a 
great edifice of  perception is constructed that is ultimately neither truly true nor fully 
false, but hangs somewhere in the no man’s land between truth and falsehood. The 
public cannot be exposed to too much truth; and no truth fully exists in the sense in 
which the objectivist would claim. Moreover, the lie, or duplicitous statement, serves 
the elevated purpose, the goal of  national solidarity and national greatness: they see 
virtue in what they do. The lower lie serves the higher truth. The West in contrast 
had simply forgotten (or never absorbed) the idea of  propaganda, the lessons of  
the Nazi and Soviet eras and what a powerful tool it could be in terms of  disrupting 
global politics and sabotaging the civic order.
1 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of  History And The Last Man, (New York: The Free Press 1992).
2 Paxton, Robert O., The Anatomy of  Fascism, (London: Allen Lane, 2004).
3 O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas, Selling Hitler: Propaganda and the Nazi Brand, (London: Hurst, 2016).
4 Cottrell, Robert, ‘Death Under The Tsar’ (review of  Anna Politkoyavska, A Russian Diary), New York Review of  
Books, 14 June 2007.
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1. Pseudo-Reality: External
The article first looks at persuasion directed to the outer world, a kind of  propaganda -augmented 
foreign policy.
But the pseudo-democratic authoritarian state is all about the creation of  parallel 
reality. The pseudo-real therefore is consciously produced, it is manufactured 
using the expertise of  those experienced in the area. Goebbels hired the American 
publications guru Ivy Lee in the 1930s,5 the Putin regime has used the resources of  
Ketchum, an American public relations firm, as well as various other Western firms. 
The appearance of  Putin as Times Person of  the year in 2007 was the result of  
Ketchum lobbying.6 But for such an investment to be made there has to be a deeply 
held conviction that it is in fact effective: ‘Dmitry Kiselyov is quite open about the 
Russian media strategy for the millenium: to “apply the correct political technology”, 
then ‘bring it to the point of  overheating’ and bring to bear ‘the magnifying glass of  
TV and the Internet”.’7 
Under these propaganda regimes events often do not exist in their own right but 
rather they are faked. One famous example of  this is a Nazi fabrication during 
the Saar referendum (1935) where Goebbels broadcast the lie that Max Braun, the 
leader of  the anti-German unity faction, had in fact fled the country (Goebbels had 
freely distributed radio transmitters which broadcast this message).8 Realities do not 
arise naturally in the pseudo democratic entity. Events do not occur, they must be 
manufactured. This is the essence of  the KGB ethos, the milieu from which Putin 
and his henchmen emerged: ‘It is not by accident that Putin and his colleagues all 
share the KGB’s belief  in the power of  the state to control the life of  the nation 
[...] In the course of  their training, they learned that events cannot be allowed to just 
happen, they must be controlled and manipulated; that markets cannot be genuinely 
open, they must be managed from behind the scenes; that elections cannot be 
unpredictable, they must be planned in advance—as, indeed, Russia’s now are.’9 But 
the director of  the Isvetsia publishing house once suggested ‘image is not reality, but, 
rather, its reflection, which can be made positive’.10 
Disinformation:  The Nazis of  course were experts at disinformation and the 
creative use of  communication to disseminate it. They had groups to spread 
rumours,11 fake horoscopes,12 and groups to spread graffiti.13 The role of  organised 
lying is important because, paradoxically, it indicates what the regime is really thinking. 
5 Manvell, Roger and Heinrich Fraenkel, Doctor Goebbels: His Life And Death, (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 
2010).
6 Institute of  Modern Russia, ‘The Propaganda Of  The Putin Era (Part Two): The Kremlin's Tentacles’, 5 Dec 
2012.
7 Snyder, Timothy, ‘Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine’, New York Review of  Books, 20 March 2014.
8 Wiskemann, Elizabeth, Europe Of  The Dictators 1919-1945, (London: Fontana, 1975).
9 Applebaum, Anne, ‘Vladimir’s Tale’, New York Review of  Books, 29 March 2012.
10 Institute of  Modern Russia, ‘The Propaganda Of  The Putin Era’.
11 Herzstein, Robert Edwin, The War That Hitler Won, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979).
12 Speer, Albert, Inside The Third Reich,  (London: Macmillan, 1970).
13 Beevor, Anthony, Berlin: The Downfall 1945, (London: Penguin, 2003).
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So, lying becomes a form of  truth, or at least a truth about the regime. The forms of  
disinformation embraced by the Nazis were extensive—for example the clandestine 
radio stations targeted at the British such as the Christian People’s Station or the 
Workers Challenge Station or Radio Caledonia or Radio Cymru.14
Russian disinformation, or dezinformatsiya, is designed to sabotage the notion of  
objective truth and paralyse action.15 After the destruction of  Malaysian Airlines 
Flight 17 over Ukraine, Russia ‘pumped out a dizzying array of  theories’ about the 
shooting down of  Flight 17 and blame was at various stages placed on the CIA and 
Ukrainian fighter pilots, etc.16 When Swedes debated a NATO affiliation, there was a 
sudden barrage of  claims, for example, that NATO would locate nuclear missiles in 
Sweden or independently attack Russia or that its soldiers could rape Swedish women 
without criminal sanction; thus ‘The flow of  misleading and inaccurate stories is so 
strong that both NATO and the European Union have established special offices to 
identify and refute disinformation, particularly claims emanating from Russia’.17
Russian lies included claims such as the story about a Colombian chemicals factory 
in Louisiana that was blown up by ISIS terrorists in 2014 on September 11, later 
revealed in the New York Times.18 Such stories appear in social media and they 
are planted by a Russian propaganda organisation named the Internet Research 
Agency and created by Putin. They create hoaxes via Twitter accounts and Arabic 
commentary—for example the fake Louisiana television images that appeared 
on You Tube.19 The employees of  these so-called troll farms compose imaginary 
stories and propaganda against America and the Ukraine, and also engage in online 
harassment and protracted argumentation in the comment sections of  websites. A 
British journalist ‘described Russia’s actions as an attempt to undermine the concept 
of  objective reality itself ’ before the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 
2015.20  Other examples of  Russian disinformation include for example the assertion 
that Ebola is the fault of  the US government.
Current propaganda practices represent the heritage of  the Soviet Union, a lineal 
continuity adjusted to cyberspace. In the old days, the Kremlin also engaged in 
disinformation, e.g. its claim that AIDS was an invention of  the CIA.21 During the 
cold war the Soviets injected disinformation via stories placed in Indian newspapers. 
Subsidy of  antagonistic groups was another Soviet trick, of  anti-nuclear groups for 
example; and this continues: in 2014 the Kremlin offered an $11.7 million loan to the 
French National Front.22 A disinformation campaign was also synchronised with the 
14 West, W. J., Truth Betrayed, (London: Duckworth and Co., 1987).








22  MaxFarquhar, Neil, ‘How Russians Pay To Play In Other Countries’, New York Times, 31 December 2016.
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Ukraine attack, according to Tim Snyder: ‘the Russian media continually make the 
claim that the Ukrainians protesting are Nazis’.23 Claims included the one that gay 
marriage will be forced on Ukraine as the price of  a closer relationship with Europe. 
Information: There is disinformation and then there is information—the ‘true’ facts 
gained from hacking and used/abused propagandistically. But this is conceptually 
distinct from disinformation even if  it comes from the same stable. The truths emerging 
may well be correct and that is why they are also very damaging. Thus ‘Fancy Bears’, 
a Russian cyberspace proxy, persuaded the German newspaper Spiegel to reveal that 
US athletes had been gaining medical permissions to take restricted substances;24 
this was revenge for the stories about Russian athletics doping.25 Analysts believe 
that it was Fancy Bears that hacked the Democratic National Committee accounts 
revealing the Clinton emails.26 One reporter claimed that Fancy Bears apparently 
operated ‘almost more like a PR firm’ and were ‘very business-like’.27 Moreover, the 
distinction between information and disinformation is not clear-cut. The agenda to 
sabotage the 2016 US Presidential election was implemented by the GRU, Russian 
military intelligence, via front organisations.28 Fronts had, of  course, been a favourite 
resource of  the old USSR, but this time they tenanted cyberspace: specifically two 
that appeared in the summer of  2016, Guccifer 2.0 and the DC leaks. The latter 
claimed to be ‘launched by American hacktivists who respect and appreciate freedom 
of  speech’29 and lubricated the social media attacks on Hilary Clinton, sometimes via 
Russian websites such as the Putin-aligned Katehon (e.g. ‘Bloody Hilary: mysterious 
murders linked to Clinton’).30
Sow Confusion: The aim is not so much to create belief  as to sow confusion and 
doubt. One is reminded of  Mark Twain’s aphorism, that a lie can travel halfway round 
the world while truth is still tying up its shoes. This creation of  confusion, this sowing 
of  doubt, is matched on the internal domestic front by the seeking of  a passive and 
compliant public. But this is not the same as a believing public: ‘By eroding the very 
idea of  a shared reality, and by spreading apathy and confusion among a public that 
learns to distrust leaders and institutions alike, kompromat undermines society’s ability 
to hold the powerful to account and ensure the proper functioning of  government’.31
All of  them of  course seek to generate division among their antagonists—to disunite 
their enemies, and this is a very tangible achievement of  their propaganda, Putin 
23 Snyder, ‘Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine’
24 Fischer, Max, ‘Prizing Speed and Scoops, Media Became Ready Bullhorns For Russian Hackers’, New York 
Times, 9 January 2017.
25 Kramer, Andrew E., ‘How The Kremlin Recruited An Army Of  Specialists To Wage Its Cyber War’, New 
York Times, 30 December 2016.
26 Ibid.
27 Fischer, ‘Prizing Speed and Scoops’.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 McIntire, Mike, ‘How A Putin Fan Overseas Pushed Pro-Trump Propaganda To Americans’, New York Times, 
18 December 2016.
31 Taub, Amanda, ‘Kompromat And The Danger Of  Doubt And Confusion In A Democracy’, New York Times, 
16 January 2017. 
118
alternately threatening Europeans and speaking softly to them, and seeking internal 
discord as well by attempting to find favour with political groupings within those 
societies—from Donald Trump in America to Nigel Farage, former leader of  the UK 
Independence party, Beppe Grillo in Italy, to Victor Orban in Hungary. The Czech 
President Milos Zeman has been a consistent friend, defending Russian engagement 
in Syria for example. Bulgaria now has a new pro-Russian Prime Minister;32 the leader 
of  a pro-Russian party has been nominated as Estonian Prime Minister;33 and Angela 
Merkel has voiced fears of  a Russian cyber-attack during the German elections.34 
Interventions on behalf  of  sympathetic politicians or public actors is part of  the 
Russian propaganda manual: ‘useful idiots’ were prized also by the Soviets and the 
Bolsheviks before them. 
Plausibility: There is of  course a tendency to represent these public fictions as 
testament to the credulity of  its targets, the people. We believe that it is more 
accurately characterised as a co-production rather than a naive or hypodermic 
stimulus-response model. The target is invited to share a fantasy; the fiction is co-
created rather than imposed. So, this model is a participative one. 
And furthermore, it does not rest on fiction alone, or even primarily fiction, but on 
effective advocacy whose premises can be made to seem rational even if  they are not. 
The arguments advanced are given an objective veneer. Thus, the Third Reich was 
adept at producing a rationale for invasion at every turn: for example that the Poles 
were preparing for war against Germany, that Russia was plotting to attack Germany; 
so that all violence became pre-emptive. And this is pre-eminently true of  Russia 
today. It has constructed an elaborate edifice of  public self-defence both for internal 
and for international consumption. The representation of  NATO and the EU as 
aggressive and expansionary powers that threaten Russia destroy the former implicit 
and explicit understandings of  Russia’s ‘legitimate’ sphere of  influence. Believable 
as an argument: but it denies to other much smaller nations those very rights, the 
right to choose which, if  any, power block they might elect to belong to. Plausibility 
is also enhanced by scattering truths amid falsehoods, a Goebbels technique, and 
similarly Russian disinformation campaigns have ‘often deliberately blended accurate 
and forged details’.35
2. Pseudo-Reality: Internal and External
Here we further look at how symbol manipulation is used both externally and internally to construct 
pseudo-realities
Foreign Policy as Symbolism: Foreign policy objectives are also propaganda 
ones. Under the Nazis foreign policy events, everything from the re-militarisation 
32 Oliphant, Roland, ‘Pro-Russian candidates win presidential votes in Bulgaria and Moldova’, Daily Telegraph. 14 
November 2016.
33 Mardiste, David, ‘Centre-left leader nominated as Estonia’s next PM’, Reuters, 20 November 2016.
34 ‘Russian cyber-attacks could influence German election, says Merkel’, Guardian, 8 November 2016.
35 Thomas Read, cited in Taub, ‘Kompromat And The Danger Of  Doubt’.
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of  the Rhine (1936) to the Sudeten crisis (1938) to the Anschluss (1938) etc., all 
of  these were international crises which Hitler managed to perfection and set out 
as a theatre producer would.36 Putin is an effective manager of  such tensions at 
the symbolic level. His wars, in Chechnya, in Georgia, in Ukraine, and in Syria are 
carefully calibrated so as not to force the West into fighting Russia while at the 
same time representing the West as weak and Russia as strong. There have been the 
set piece essays in symbolic theatre such as the Winter Olympics at Sochi (2014). 
And again with China, foreign policy serves the need of  national self-assertion and 
the mobilisation of  public opinion and more generally national solidarity. In other 
words, it serves a propagandist imperative. And similarly, with the symbolism of  
Chinese resolution: its refusal to allow any compromise on Tibet and its continued 
insistence that Taiwan is part of  the China mainland.
One language used by the Russian government is the international language of  
propaganda as articulated through symbols. Putin’s presentation of  an Alsatian 
puppy dog to French security forces after one of  their own was killed in a shootout 
with terrorists is one example.37 This one gesture reveals all we need to know about 
the Russian understanding of  symbolism. In China, by contrast, symbolism would 
appear more muted: every international act of  Chinese gift-giving, an airport here, a 
highway there, and so forth is a symbol. And that symbol is of  a China that is friendly. 
Soft power is moreover the official doctrine of  China and it is therefore a doctrine 
governed by symbolism and a recognition of  the power of  symbolic strategies; and 
these have included 24-hour global television channels, the opening of  Confucius 
Institutes across the globe and the Olympic Games (2008) and the Expo (2010). 
Then we examine internally directed persuasion strategies, towards the domestic constituency. 
Management of  the symbolic realm: Symbols and the construction of  the 
symbolic realm was of  course the supreme feature of  the Third Reich itself. The 
Nazis embodied in this everything from public art, to the theatre of  foreign policy, 
to the ritual performances of  the auditorium,38 even to the conduct of  warfare itself. 
Thus, symbolism can be included among the reasons behind the battle of  Stalingrad. 
Less universally understood perhaps is the extent of  the recourse to symbolism 
of  the Russian and Chinese governments. The importance of  symbolism can be 
succinctly stated: a way of  reaching the non-political nation and those who would 
not be prepared to follow a complex argument. Symbols are multi-valent. Symbols 
condense meaning, they resonate, offering multiple possibilities of  interpretation; 
there is a body of  literature which suggests that the mind itself  works by hosting 
symbolic representations.39 In other words, symbols represent a language that lies 
deeper than language, they are an independent linguistic form more powerful than 
mere words. 
36 Hoffman, Heinrich, Hitler In Seiner Heimat [photo-journal], (Berlin: Zeitgeschichte-Verlag, 1938).
37 Lomas, Claire, ‘Russia gives France puppy to replace dog killed in St Denis Raid’, Daily Telegraph, 8 December 
2015.
38 Spotts, Frederic, Hitler And The Power Of  Aesthetics, (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2004).
39 Geertz, Clifford, Local Knowledge: Further Essays In Interpretative Anthropology, (Basic Books, 1984).
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The regime of  Vladimir Putin is intensely invested in symbols and symbolic 
strategies. Putin himself  as a symbol embodies the persona of  the state and the idea 
of  the state. He is certainly a charismatic leader in the Weberian sense and he deploys 
charismatic authority in many different ways, as manifest in serial role-play he is a 
judo champion, a country and western singer, a muscleman fly-fishing half- naked, 
and much else. But he is also well capable of  suggesting a soft side, a more nuanced 
portrait, as with his ‘Blueberry Hills’ manoeuvre where he sang the well-known US 
country song before amazed onlookers (it went viral over social media).40 Before her 
murder, the journalist Anna Politkovskaya described Putin’s shameless role playing 
and in particular his ability to symbolise values that were exactly the reverse of  those 
which actually animated his Russian state. Mimicry, she thought, is the essence of  
the facsimile: ‘on cattle breeders day [Putin] is our most illustrious cattle breeder; on 
Builder’s day he is our foremost brickie. It is bizarre, of  course, but Stalin played the 
same game. ‘Today,  as luck would have it, is International Human Rights Day, so 
Putin summoned our foremost champions of  human rights [...] For the most part, 
Putin listened to what was being said and, when he did speak, presented himself  
as being on their side. He mimicked being a human rights champion […].He is an 
excellent imitator. When need be, he is one of  you; when that is not necessary, he is 
your enemy’.41 And the connection with the serial role enactments by Hitler himself  
needs no comment, for the essence of  the Hitler act is that he was many things, 
statesman, frontline soldier, street fighter, and folk comrade.42
Perception Management: History and Myth: In all these cases—China, Russia, 
Nazi Germany, and other cases as well—we see the invention of  the past. The past 
is there to sustain the present and to sustain the political regime which exists in this 
present. History, or at least publicly narrated history, in other words is exclusively a 
theatre of  propaganda and nothing else. Likewise, with Russia, it does not so much 
forget as never remember or selectively remember so that perception is manipulated 
via the misrepresentation of  the past in order to promulgate a distorted idea of  
the present. There is thus the retro-configuring of  history—and in the Nazi case 
the posthumous ‘baptising’ of  so many of  the great figures in German culture and 
history like Nietzsche or Frederick Schiller as proto-Nazis.43 And they ‘sold’ their 
confections via their great film industry centred on Babelsberg, with costume drama 
films like The Great King, The Dismissal, Kolberg, Rite of  Sacrifice.44 We do, in 
other words, retrieve figures from the past to fit the new narrative, as China does 
in continuing to represent Chairman Mao as the icon of  the state even though the 
practice of  the state is the opposite of  everything Mao ever believed in.
For Russia and for Putin however there is a problem since the Russian past is two 
regimes, the Tsarist, and the Bolshevik, the one being the enemy of  the other. It 
has been an achievement of  political imagination on Putin’s part to reconcile this 
primordial antagonism embossed on Russia’s history: to take both the symbols of  
40 ‘Sing-along-Vlad: now Putin is Blueberry Hill crooner of  the Kremlin’, 12 December 2010.
41 Cottrell, ‘Death Under The Tsar’.
42  Kershaw, Ian, The ‘Hitler Myth’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
43  Gitlis, Baruch, and Norman Berdichevsky, Cinema of  Hate, (Bnei Brak, Israel: Alpha Communication, 1996).
44  Renstshler, Eric, The Ministry of  Illusion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
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Sovietism and the symbols of  Tsarism and shamelessly use both to perpetuate his 
regime, creating a kind of  unitary past, or reconciled narrative, out of  the murderous 
chaos of  Russia’s 20th century. Thus, while retaining Bolshevist symbols and signs, 
such as the retro-Soviet celebration of  the anniversary of  the end of  World War 
Two on 9 May 2015, May Day parades, and so forth, and the rituals, some Tsarist 
symbols have also been disinterred. In 1998 Tsar Nicholas had been re-entombed 
under Boris Yeltsin; but General Denikin, the most prominent of  the white Russian 
military leaders, who died in exile in Michigan in 1947, was reburied in Moscow by a 
fond Putin.45 And Admiral Kolchak, the leader of  the White Russians in the East, has 
been elevated now to the pantheon of  Russian heroes and placed within the grand 
narrative by a movie honouring his achievements.46 
Celestial Pseudo-Mysticism: Another feature is pseudo-mysticism. The Nazis 
preserved the form of  religion and politicised it into a civic religion, while rejecting 
its existential content. Putin’s Russia has not needed to do this, the Orthodox Church, 
rejected and then rehabilitated by Stalin, has always been a devout ancillary of  the 
Russian leadership. God, therefore, is on the side of  Russia: and he is moreover the 
Christian God rather than the abstract Providence or pagan ersatz Valhalla evoked by 
the Nazis. This servicing of  the existential needs of  a dictatorship must be regarded 
as one of  the great achievements of  the pseudo-democracy. If  the state possesses 
this aura, if  it has divine sanction, then that exists independently of  democratically 
derived authority as an alternative source of  authority. Little Father Tsar, there by 
divine right, has transformed into Vladimir Putin, a Tsar for our times. In this the 
Russian regime has an advantage over China. This lack of  an existential claim is a real 
problem for the Chinese regime since people suffer from a spiritual deficit.
In China, this is more problematic since, far from a clean break and repudiation of  
the Communist regime, the current government is the continuity of  that regime. 
Therefore its symbolic and ritual heritage cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, this is 
still a remarkable act of  symbolism and political prestidigitation. For the continuity 
regime is in economic terms the antithesis of  the founder regime even though it is 
paradoxically the same regime. While this contradiction is apparent to every Chinese 
person it cannot be publicly admitted and the political uses of  the past in this case 
are to sustain a bizarre and gigantic public falsehood. So Chairman Mao remains 
honoured, not merely in a political sense but in a neo-mystical sense as well, as the 
father of  the nation and founder of  the Communist state. 
The Material—Consumption: Consumption is another component of  the 
symbolic realm and the symbols of  consumerism are propaganda, even though they 
do not overtly articulate a political meaning, for that meaning is implicit—symbols 
of  consumerism are symbols of  affluence and plenty. The world of  goods on offer 
proclaims the regime’s identity as a benevolent provider. China has sought to solve 
many of  the problems of  internal discontent by the energising of  a consumer 
economy. In other words, consumerism is being used to solve political problems 
and also symbolises the competence and efficiency of  the Chinese regime—the 
45  Robinson, Paul, ‘The Return of  White Russia’, The Spectator, 29 October 2005.
46  The Admiral, 2008, Russia, directed by Andrei Kravchuk
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Communist Party—in delivering on its promises. The poetry of  consumption, this 
evangelical materialism, characterises modern China: the regime is unthinkable 
without the consumerist cornucopia that it has engendered. This was also true of  the 
Nazis who sought to blind people to the deficiencies of  the regime by offering them 
the glories of  consumption.47 The Strength-Through-Joy car (transformed post-war 
into the volkswagen Beatle), although no one ever received one under the Reich, is a 
case in point: it is a symbol of  consumer promise, the promise of  enhanced mobility. 
Pseudo-Democracy: Democracy itself  becomes part of  this pseudo-reality. If  other 
aspects of  reality can be invented, so can the idea of  democracy. Pseudo-democracy 
is a facsimile of  democracy which both adopts some of  its rhetoric and some of  its 
accountability procedures at the purely symbolic level. Pseudo-democracies may even 
have some basis in real democracy in that there are ostensibly genuine ‘elections’, but 
in these elections, the opposition is intimidated and denied publicity opportunities 
and air-time. It is constrained by violence and this is as true of  Putin’s Russia as it 
is true of  contemporary Venezuela under the Chavistas. The creation of  alternative 
reality is a common property of  such regimes, who find a formula for self-perpetuity 
embodied in the notion of  pseudo-democracy.
And so, all of  them create a pastiche of  democratic process, and pay homage to the 
idea. The Chinese probably least of  all, as they publicly invest truth in the idea of  
the party and the party as all-knowing, but even the Chinese have to entertain some 
elements of  pseudo-democracy. For example, there does in fact exist a right-wing 
in China which is ultranationalist and for the Communist Party is both a resource 
and an embarrassment: they don’t want it to get out of  hand. And yet this right-
wing is authentic, the party neither created it nor controls it entirely. Thus, one 
aspect of  pseudo-democratic states is that they are not really totalitarian and engage 
residual aspects of  democratic practice. In a recent incident, a prominent group of  
chauvinist cyber-activists spammed the Facebook page of  Taiwan’s new president.48 
Pseudo-democracy in China therefore allows a certain amount of  dissent, unlicensed 
contrariness. The expression of  grievance is protected at the individual level but 
prevented from merging with other critical voices into a movement or coalition of  
criticism.49 
The Nazis were keen to continue with the democratic pretence that the press was in 
fact free: as in permitting the so-called bourgeois press to continue its existence.50 
And the Nazis were very concerned to make it look as if  they had a popular mandate 
as expressed through the five pre-war ‘referenda’ and through an alternative paradigm 
of  democracy—the concept of  Hitler as, in some way, diviner of  the public will, a 
kind of  seer able to read the public mood and respond—so that he was not in fact a 
dictator at all but a kind of  maven or mystic with an intuitive understanding of  what 
47 Ross, Corey, Media and the Making of  Modern Germany, (Oxford University Press, 2008).
48 Sonnad, Nikhil, ‘China's Internet Propaganda Is More Subtle And Sophisticated Than It Has Ever Been’, 
Quartz, 23 May 2016. 
49 Ibid.
50 Hale, Orin, The Captive Press In The Third Reich, (Princeton University Press, 1964).
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people sought.51 So mass rallies were presented as a form of  acclamatory democracy 
where the speeches of  the leadership cadre, and particularly of  Hitler, were endorsed 
by the masses in auditoria throughout the nation.
3. Coercion
At this stage the article turns from persuasion to look at coercion and coercive strategies employed in 
several formats—emotional (mobilisation of  fear), physical, and ideological.
Fear: Propaganda seeks out and exploits the most powerful emotions, and these 
almost invariably relate to questions of  our own survival. There are of  course many 
other kinds of  appeal. But it is primarily in the negative emotions that propaganda 
activities reside. In psychological terms, we understand what we hate better than what 
we like.52 Because the fear appeal is supercharged with emotion and easy to dramatise, 
easy to rhetoricise, easy to symbolise, and easy to mythologise, it is the ones which 
dominates. Fear is a very effective appeal because public opinion is often tentative. 
Where there is ambiguity, a rhetorical assertion of  the possibility of  threat can clarify 
opinion. Moreover the psychology of  this is well attested, the thesis of  Tversky and 
Kahneman suggests that the anguish of  loss is greater than an equivelancy of  gain.53
Existential Threat: Then there is the existential threat. For Putin the extrenal threat 
lies in the West with its armies on the border of  Russia, while the internal threat 
eminates from fanatical Islamists thirsting to destroy Christendom and the Russian 
state. And this is very convenient as a source of  authority. To Hitler, of  course, this 
threat was embodied in the English and later the Americans; international plutocracy 
and, more specifically, the Jews who were the enemy behind all enemies so that in a 
very real sense the Nazis saw all of  their enemies as part of  the Jewish conspiracy 
and, for them, all in fact became Jews, e.g. propaganda referring to Roosevelt as 
‘the Grand Rabbi’.54 Similarly today, migration creates the existential threat-crises 
Putin needs to legitimate his regime/coercive methods, e.g. the Russian state TV 
story about how the daughter of  a Russian resident of  Germany was raped by a 
migrant. This was, in fact, a complete fabrication, but no matter, it gained traction 
and currency.55 But propaganda as we have said works because it does not commit 
the error of  asking for belief: it wears a sly smile. It is perhaps really a case of  lies 
being a deeper form of  ‘truth’. Propaganda is, in fact, primarily a solidarity-enhancing 
vehicle and once that solidarity is established much else follows. The ability to sustain 
war, for example. 
There is also a vast ecology of  right-wing websites that pose as truth-tellers with the 
explicit message that they are revealing what the conventional media are concealing. 
51 Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’; Schulze Wechsungen, Walther, ‘Political Propaganda’, Unser Wille und Weg 4, 1934; 
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Such highly partisan websites are used to publish stories that may or may not be true; 
they are hostile to the liberal west and favour a very right wing and also a Russian 
narrative.56 Thus, about forty pro-Russian websites operate in the Czech Republic 
and foment an anti-EU climate, such that less than one third of  Czechs view the 
EU positively.57 Their claims carry sufficient credibility to be listened to because of  
their resonance, in Schwartz’s terms, that effective political persuasion should surface 
feelings already latent within the minds of  the target.58 
There is another improbable comparison between Goebbels and Putin where 
both specifically posed as the defenders of  European civilisation: simultaneously 
threatening/executing the scourge of  invasion while also posing as the saviour of  
Europe. Thus, Goebbels’s great mid-war campaign, Fortress Europe or Festung 
Europa – Germany as the shield against the mongrelised Bolshevik hordes.59 And 
Putin simultaneously is exploiting the West’s, specifically Europe’s, new-found sense 
of  extreme vulnerability. He could pose as defender of  Christendom against Islamism 
as with his mention of  the rape of  a child by a migrant in Austria (the case is set for 
re-trial) and the perversity of  the West: ‘a society that can’t defend its children has 
no to-morrow’.60 Imagery of  vengeful Russian jets contrasted with the remembrance 
of  Isis atrocities, and the Isis theatre of  sadism made it easier to accept Russian 
bombing of  civilians. In doing this Putin creates many admirers, part of  a peculiar 
inclusion now of  Russia into the Western rightist’s narrative. Trump, notoriously, 
invited the Russian government to hack into Hilary Clinton’s emails.61 Kremlin 
techniques are seeking to divide eastern Europe between those with a deep hostility 
to Russia (Ukraine and Poland) and those with a greater fear of  immigration/militant 
Islam (Hungary, etc). The Russians have created a luminous narrative, powerful, 
comprehensive, and bitterly partisan, that helps trigger a polarisation effect in public 
opinion, exaggerating existing political division.
Physical coercion: There is a calculus as to how much force to use in relation to 
alternative methods of  influence, so what we see is the parallel functioning of  both 
coercion and persuasion as indeed in all authoritarian societies. There is no real rule 
of  law as such, but rather the operation of  power unconstrained by either law or 
the traditions of  a civic state. The use of  murder in Russia to silence public critics, 
China’s stifling and imprisonment of  dissidents, or the true homicidal nihilism of  
Russia’s foreign engagements—everything from the desolation of  Chechnya to 
the bombing of  Aleppo—are only points on a continuum and do moreover offer 
legitimate comparison to Germany before the Second World War and the start of  
the genocide. The deaths of  critical journalists are consistent with the nature of  
fascism, i.e. organised violence either foregrounded or at the margin; for example the 
56  McIntire, ‘How A Putin Fan’.
57  MaxFarquhar, ‘How Russians Pay To Play’.
58  Schwartz, Tony, Media the Second God, (New York: Doubleday, 1983).
59  Klemperer, Victor, The Language of  the Third Reich (London: Athlone, 2000).
60  Newton, Jennifer, ‘A society that cannot defend its children has no to-morrow...’, Daily Mail, 3 November 
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61  Ackerman, Spencer and Sam Thielman, ‘Trump’s comments on Russia denounced as ‘shocking and 
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murder of  Anna Politkoyavska on 7 October 2006.62 This both restricts the supply 
of  hostile information by eliminating its sources, and deters others. The dark side 
of  the regime is so very public, as with the plutonium-facilitated murder of  the ex-
KGB critic Litvinenko in London. Such extrajudicial killings were characteristic of  
the Third Reich where the SS was the bearer of  sovereignty and existed beyond the 
legal state.63 Propaganda, in other words, is an agent of  repression. Its aim is to cast 
light elsewhere, away from the dark side.
Ideology: It is difficult to imagine a propaganda actually devoid of  ideology. Ideology 
is a way of  answering all questions from a state’s own internal resources; propaganda 
imposes a coherent meaning, resolves all uncertainty. One cannot of  course have 
pseudo-democracy without an ideology, since coercion needs the legitimation which 
a set of  didactic principles can bestow. Schulze-Wechsungen had claimed that: ‘Our 
propaganda had to shake the foundations of  the core of  the Marxist idea in the minds 
and hearts of  the masses, the theory of  class struggle. Then we had to replace it with a 
new theory […]’.64 Hence Putinism found a new ideology to give it a fig leaf  of  dignity, 
i.e. National Bolshevism, and the Eurasianism of  the political scientist Alexander 
Dugin,  which is a direct derivative of  fascism: ‘it proposes the realisation of  National 
Bolshevism. Rather than rejecting totalitarian ideologies, Eurasianism calls upon the 
politicians of  the 21st century to draw what is useful from both Fascism and Stalinism. 
Julian’s major work, The Foundations of  Geopolitics, published in 1997, follows 
closely the ideas of  Carl Schmitt, the leading Nazi political theorist’.65 So a function 
of  propaganda is to create and sell this ideology, i.e. the aim is self-legitimation since 
no appeal can be based on the supremacy of  might alone: ‘The ethnic purification 
of  the Communist legacy is precisely the logic of  National Bolshevism, which is 
the foundation ideology of  Eurasianism to-day. Putin himself  is an admirer of  the 
philosopher Ivan Ilin, who wanted Russia to be a nationalist dictatorship.’66
Chauvinism: The stress on patriotism, its symbols and rituals, are another feature 
these regimes share. Cottrell remarked after re-reading Anna Polytskova’s diary that 
our assumption had been that ‘its imperial ambitions were spent. It could be trusted 
to keep its problems to itself. Now, politically if  not yet militarily, the Russian state 
is moving in a direction which is terrifying for its neighbours and dismaying for its 
friends—much as if  Putin were preparing the ground for a crisis or a confrontation 
which would justify staying in power beyond the end of  his second presidential term 
next year’.67 Russia wants to regain what it has lost, power over its neighbourhood. 
The retrieval of  a lost pride also explains much of  what China does and much of  their 
propaganda is directed to that end. But manifestly they are playing a different kind 
of  power game to other states, not seeking global military projection/involvement in 
world conflicts. While the nature of  Chinese engagement overseas is transactional, it 
ostensibly carries no baggage of  cultural dominance or militaristic hegemony.
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Anti-West: In fact, such regimes exist in a curious and contradictory relationship 
to capitalism and plutocracy, simultaneously exploiting anti-plutocratic rhetoric as 
a public language that defines them, that evokes a sense of  cause and mission and 
a differentiation from the capitalist West, while also being essentially plutocracies 
themselves with tiny elites. There is a cultivated paranoia which chooses to see all 
criticism as malign and externally imposed. Thus Putin declared (2007) ‘there are 
still those people in our country who act like jackals of  foreign embassies’.68 Russia 
sees a Manichean world of  friends and enemies and those enemies are the liberal 
politicians and parties and international institutions hostile to Russia such as the EU 
and NATO. America and Europe are portrayed in Russian media such as RT and 
Sputnik in hyperbolic terms; the United States is a crime-ridden dystopia and Europe 
is collapsing under the weight of  terrorism and mass migration.
The new trends in Chinese propaganda have been an intensification of  that paranoid 
anti-Western rhetoric, such as a video warning of  the West’s ‘devilish claws’.69 One 
recent video was described as a ‘seven-and-a-half-minute phantasmagoria of  the 
Communist Party’s nightmares of  western subversion’.70 The Party apparently really 
believes that it confronts not fragmented foes but a Washington-led international 
conspiracy to subvert it: ‘this conspiratorial worldview is more than bombast’; 
another film, ‘Silent Contest’, made by China’s National Defence University in 2014, 
‘was even more breathless in its depiction of  Western threats’.71 
4. Soft Power
Next, the article reviews crucial differences in the ethos and conduct of  propaganda then and now.
A Theory of  Evangelism:  These then were all states in which propaganda was the 
operational doctrine—in the case of  China and Russia in fact an inherited one, since 
this tool was a paradigm mechanism of  the states which preceded them and to which 
they are the legatees. But what they did was ad hoc. It was guided by a tradition of  
persuasion and less so by a coherent ideology and theory of  persuasion, whatever 
the language they choose to dress it up in e.g. ‘public diplomacy’.72 Only the Nazis 
really possessed a more fully developed theory of  propaganda to understand and 
explain and direct what they did. So, there is a distinction: 
‘What made the Nazis special was their pursuit of  propaganda not just as a 
tool, an instrument of  government—which had in fact often been the case 
in history before—but as the totality, the idea through which government 
itself  governed. They saw public opinion as something that could be created, 
commodified and re-made. Nor was there really a distinction between policy 
and propaganda[…]’.73 
68 Applebaum, ‘Vladimir’s Tale’.
69 Hernandez, Javier, ‘Propaganda With a Millenial Twist Pops Up in China’, New York Times, 1 January 2017.
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But this is changing. Propaganda is now a major part of  Russia’s strategic arsenal and 
an instrument of  war by other means. General Valery V. Gerasimov, Chief  of  the 
General Staff  of  the Russian Armed forces, published: 
‘what became known as the Gerasimov doctrine. It posits that in the world 
today, the lines between war and peace are blurred and that covert tactics, 
such as working through proxies or otherwise in the shadows, would rise in 
importance’.74 
He called it non-linear warfare. His critics call it ‘guerilla geopolitics’.75 Gerasimov 
has explained that ‘the role of  non-military means of  achieving political and strategic 
goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of  force of  
weapons in their effectiveness’ (2013).76  
A Philosophy of  Soft Power: There is also the relationship between hard and what 
today we call soft power. It is more difficult to see the Nazis as embracing soft 
power, but in certain ways they did in relation to those states they wanted on their 
side or whose neutrality they sought, such as Finland or Spain. Where necessary, 
Hitler would indeed swallow his pride if  an alliance was sought or an emollient 
or submissive posture was the necessity of  the moment. So, the Nazis did fitfully 
practice this, as with the 1936 Berlin Olympics and the 1938 Paris Expo.77
For China, their exercises in hard power, such as their territorial claims to the Spratly 
Islands in the China Sea, are thought through in relation to the broader context of  
soft power. Indeed, they use the methods of  soft power to pursue them. Thus, a 
film articulating the Chinese case in a South China Sea conflict was showing 120 
times a day in Times Square; it was a propaganda response to the judicial ruling of  
the Hague Tribunal.78 Increasingly, their propaganda speaks with modern accents, 
imagery is drawn unapologetically from the world of  consumption: ‘the video 
boasts the production values and soaring music of  a multinational firm’s big brand 
advertising campaign’.79 The promise of  a consumption utopia and a political utopia 
are interdependent and the stylisation hints at this. Alongside this is the attempt 
to humanize President Xi and to move away from the bureaucratic imagery of  
previous Chinese leaderships: ‘the two-minute cartoon opens with a folksy jingle and 
a smiling bobblehead of  President Xi Jinping, dimpled and cherubic’.80 Xi himself  is 
behind the supercharged propaganda renewal, complaining (as Goebbels did) about 
lacklustre and formulaic messaging constructed by party hacks; this is potentially 
being subverted by a more self-consciously modern approach making messages go 
viral on social media. The stylization is contemporary: ‘hip-hop songs pay homage to 
party history’; for example, via the rap group CD REV—‘its patriotic music videos 
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mostly in English featuring songs about China’s claims in the South China Sea and 
Mao’s legacy’.81
Under Putin, the evolution of  a formal and conscious soft power strategy occurred 
over a number of  years. In 2000 he approved ‘creating a positive perception of  
Russia abroad’; but the New Gazette explains that ‘on the external front, inside the 
enemy trenches, it is television, not radio, aimed at foreign at a foreign audience that 
is important’ (note the choice of  metaphor: enemy trenches).82 Thus, RT (launched 
in 2005) is propaganda: not merely the news from the Russian perspective, it 
communicates or obfuscates a regime worldview.83 This of  course is in the tradition 
of  the old Bolshevik Radio Moscow. In Russia television thus transmits ‘continuous 
propaganda glorifying their leaders’.84 Yet it is a subtle form of  propaganda as it 
resembles other Western news channels and has familiar stage props. Other 
proselytising agencies include the Russian Gazette, the Valdai International 
Discussion Club, and International Cultural Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo, which 
was established by Presidential decree in 2008 and is under the auspices of  the 
Russian Foreign Ministry). 
New Media: The success—for that it is what it is—of  Russian propaganda today is 
governed by two particular kinds of  related media evolution. The first is the maturity 
of  cyberspace use as an information network replete with free but partisan media 
where objectivity has simply ceased to be the aim—a metamorphosis into an echo 
chamber with a corresponding decline of  scrutiny. The second and parallel evolution 
is the demise of  mainstream media—mainstream news channels, but specifically of  
the large local and national newspapers. The rise of  new media in all cases has a 
deterministic effect on propaganda, since it is capable of  transmitting messages on a 
scale never previously seen. 
China to-day fights a vigorous online campaign via armies of  emailers and social 
media scribes and this is centrally managed by the Party. In one investigation, analysis 
of  hacked e-mails included instructions. The most common was that of  cheerleading, 
that is to say great satisfaction with the party or with life for example ‘Way to go 
Ganzhou!’ Or ‘Party Secretary Shi is an exemplary Party Secretary!’ Hardly any of  
the posts could be categorised as ‘taunting foreign countries’ or ‘argumentative 
praise or criticism’.85 But cyberspace is a liability as well as a utility and is easily 
sabotaged, conscripted into counter-propaganda as with the ridiculing of  Putin via 
satirical memes such as the one of  him half  naked riding a bear; although this may 
also reinforce rather than undermine him. 
Their method is saturation—not simply a few slogans or a few stage-managed events, 
rather it is the manufacture of  partisan meaning on an industrial scale. The Nazis 
were also very good at this, since, even though they expired long before the rise of  
81 Ibid.
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the Internet, their radio transmissions could hit the entire globe including Australia.86 
The message of  the Indian nationalist Subhas Chander Bose, residing then in Berlin, 
could target all and any Indian who had access to radio.87 Unlike modern regimes, of  
course the Reich did not possess cyberspace; though the reach of  its six transmitters 
at Zeesen was enormous.88 And such propaganda can indeed be noticed (if  nothing 
more); the wartime radio broadcasts from Berlin of  William Joyce, ‘Lord Haw Haw’, 
were getting up to 70% of  British radio listeners at weekends.89 
Entertainment: One curious aspect is the comparative failure of  China and Russia 
to use film and entertainment as propaganda, and in this sense their methodology 
is very different from that of  Nazi Germany, since their propaganda is publicly 
stamped as such. even in the case of  RT even though it mimics an entertainment 
form. Goebbels however regarded all propaganda perceived as such to be bad 
propaganda.90 So his extensive film output resembled much more the structural 
propaganda as embodied in the Frankfurt School critique of  popular entertainment. 
5. Impact 
The objective is acquiescence, not belief: However, the object of  that propaganda 
is not necessarily to persuade, or to create true believers: rather it is to ensure passive 
acquiescence; this is an important distinction. One Chinese dissident, Han Han, 
‘argues that, to ordinary Chinese, the “news” in the official media, even if  it is true, 
always seems phoney after its official packaging, because of  its official packaging’.91 
But this doesn’t matter because the regime does not ask for belief—only the facsimile 
of  belief. The same was true of  the Nazis, they had to settle for external compliance 
not internal fervour. Han even argues that the party doesn’t want people to be too 
sincere in their love for it.92 Such regimes are asking their citizens not so much to 
deny as to selectively see. And so, in the end, the peoples of  these nations have to 
accept a duality of  vision, a binary life with a public and private sphere and they 
must learn never to confuse the two. The party’s goal ‘is not to inspire deep love of  
China or hatred of  its enemies. It instead aims to prevent, or at least break-up, any 
widespread anti-party consensus among the public’.93 This is revealing: for example 
the party emerges as subtly manipulative in its approach to online dialogue, which 
is of  course from-many-to-many rather than, as in the case of  classic government 
propaganda, from-one-to-many. This is a strategy of  distraction. What works is the 
sheer saturation level of  noise which manages to frustrate discussion of  significant 
issues. 
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Subsequently we look at the evidence for the impact of  propaganda in several senses.
Dysfunctionality of  Propaganda?: Despite the attempts at reform and reinvention, 
what remains distinctive in China and Russia is the extent to which they represent 
the continuity of  Communist propaganda methods. And yet the old monopoly-
transmitter/multiple-receivers model is no longer so powerful given the rise of  the 
Internet. Official party messages are often mocked online.94 All of  these regimes have 
giant propaganda bureaucracies. But the product remains often moribund, lacking 
the freewheeling creativity of  commercial campaigns and constrained by the atrophy 
of  the critical faculty which is inherent in the authoritarian state: ‘Along the way, the 
video issues a torrent of  inspirational platitudes. “On the road chasing our dreams, 
we walked side-by-side” viewers are told, “transcending differences in shaping the 
future together”.’95 Chinese propaganda is often clumsy, for example, the English-
language music videos praising the 13th Five-Year Plan or claiming that Americans 
love working for a Chinese boss.96 And, the old Soviet mentality ‘is still at the core of  
Russian propaganda’ and its method evokes the earlier Soviet propaganda.97 
In this of  course they exhibit very well the limitations of  propaganda as a genre, 
its evangelising properties are not great: it does not create converts so much as 
conformists. Internally there is also a dissonance between claim and practice, the 
propaganda projects a utopia, the reality is mediocrity. Moreover, while there is the 
formal (state) propaganda effort, to-day the informal unofficial (citizen) propaganda 
thrust may be more important—thousands are empowered by cyberspace. They 
produce the viral memes that subvert authority with cruel wit. 
Conclusion
The article concludes by suggesting that a propaganda-augmented pseudo democracy is, if  not the 
coming form of  world government, a significant genre for years to come. 
For both China and Russia, their internal (national) and external (global) propaganda 
campaigns are formed, in the last analysis, via five elements. They are:
 1) Consolidation: The objective is power. The party wants something specific to 
conserve its power, which is not necessarily the same thing as supporting 
aggressive assertions of  national greatness or the elimination of  all hostile 
comment.
 2) Contradiction: The monopoly of  power is directed to its preservation and the 
management of  the basic existential contradiction of  an ex-communist or even 
‘communist’ government of  a capitalist country, so the regime is essentially an 
organised hypocrisy.
94  Ibid.
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 3) Coercion: The roles of  coercion is to cut off  the information flow via intimidation, 
even including, as in the case of  Russia, the murder of  journalists and the 
imprisonment of  critics. The message is clear—don’t rock the boat. Crucially, 
criticism is equated with subversion as one observer, the Marquis de Custine, 
wrote in 1839: ‘Russia is a nation of  mutes; some magician has changed sixty 
million men into automatons’.98 
4) Coherence: The regime offers a worldview that is simple, coherent, and easily 
communicated. It is authoritarian, and this is an effective way to arouse the 
mob, given the wide appeal of  coercive force against a nation’s enemies. 
5) Calculation: There is (even in the case of  Nazi Germany) a calculus underlying 
coercion/persuasion, an understanding that they are both parts of  the same 
idea. Chinese aggression is however carefully tabulated and controlled via 
rhetorical/symbolic assertion over minor targets. It is sufficient to appeal to 
the internal constituency and tell foreigners China is no push-over, without 
actually taking any real risk of  war against people who are in fact China’s major 
markets and trading partners.
Anticipatory account: Adolf  Hitler represents an archetype and an anticipatory 
account of  what came to be, plagiarised by others either consciously or rather 
unaware of  the derivation of  their methods. I have argued:
Hitler was merely the most vivid in a by now long line of  public image makers. 
And the German people themselves were the targets of  the most vigorous, 
lucid and sophisticated public relations campaign ever conjured in all of  history, 
and one which both anticipated and surpassed the public opinion sorcery of  
the twenty-first century.99 
The methodologies that he established entered the global bloodstream, to be copied 
half  consciously by other kinds of  demagogues and aspirational autocrats. These 
strictures of  course do not apply only or merely to Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China: they 
are part in fact of  a broader movement, where democracy is used not to establish 
government parties of  either the right or the left, but to entrench visionary regimes 
founded on some idea of  a nationalist utopia. This can of  course have a left-wing as 
well as right-wing aspect: famously that of  the Chavistas and their successor Nicholas 
Maduro in Venezuela who have manipulated the forms rather than the reality of  
democracy, and have used classic propaganda techniques to do so—not least the 
attribution of  blame, and the displacement of  responsibility to external forces who 
have a malign and irrational desire to crush the government of  Venezuela. 
But there are other candidates as well, such as the new government of  the 
Philippines whose president Duterte has specifically claimed resemblances to 
Adolf  Hitler, primarily in his decision to launch a ‘holocaust’ of  drug dealers 
and drug addicts, cheerfully promising he will murder three million of  them.100 
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An earlier word in political science for such charismatic-authoritarian regimes was 
‘populism’, as for example embodied in the rule of  the Perons in Argentina. In this 
new order, whether the government does actually remain a dictatorship or graduates 
into a kind of  managed democracy, the form is always the same—propaganda is 
more than just an instrument of  government, it is in many ways the central organising 
principle of  the new nation state. 
Such states, although in no other way comparable to Nazi Germany, nevertheless 
use an admixture of  coercion, persuasion, and plebiscite. These populist appeals 
with managed outcomes are characteristic in fact of  fascism, of  which they are in so 
many ways a modern evolution: aggressive in their foreign policies and authoritarian 
at home, super-patriotic and intolerant of  internal dissent. We might speculate on 
whether the coming form of  national government globally is something similar to 
this: the triumph of  the ballot box is not foreordained, universal brotherhood is a 
difficult product to sell. For example one cannot assume that Russia and China will 
evolve into Jeffersonian democracies. The common feature is, and will be, the use of  
propaganda as lubricant, augmented by the rituals of  pseudo-democracy. 
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